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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a conceptual critique of “remote warfare.” It 
argues that “remote warfare” is more of a trendy term than a robust 
concept. In support of this assessment, this paper makes two argu-
ments. First, that there is a lack of clarity in the debate over what 
“remote warfare” is: namely, the literature is yet to explain what it 
entails. Second, that because of this lack of definitional specificity, 
we also lack an account of its analytical value: what intellectual 
leverage does it hold over existing terms making similar claims? The 
article discusses these points by expanding on the notion of 
“semantic field,” which it uses to assess how “remote warfare” 
contributes and is shaped by the broader conceptual confusion in 
the study of contemporary war and warfare.
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“[Regina George]: Gretchen, stop trying to make fetch happen! 
It’s not going to happen!” (Waters 2004)
A poor concept is a huge intellectual liability. It undermines theoretical thinking 
(Rosenau 1980), puzzlement (Zinnes 1980), measurement and operationalisation 
(Kalyvas 2003, 476), while hindering research cumulation and progress (Stanton 2019). 
The study of civil wars in recent decades provides ample evidence for this: contentious 
definitions never settling everyone’s satisfaction (Florea 2012, 80; Armitage 2017, 12); 
absence of conceptual autonomy, yet ample conceptual competition (Kalyvas 2006, 16); 
excessive politicisation (Kalyvas 2009); and difficulties in bridging practitioner-aca-
demics perspectives (Canestaro 2016, 395). At the same time, it demonstrates the 
intellectual benefits of taking concepts seriously and thinking about them creatively 
and productively: from the consolidated study of different types of armed non-state 
actors such as rebels and militias (Jentzsch et al. 2015), to the closer theoretical integra-
tion of warfare in civil war research (Kalyvas 2005; Balcells and Kalyvas 2014), and to the 
development of robust typologies of wartime social order and institutions (Arjona 2014; 
Mampilly and Stewart 2021).
This is why a poor conceptual debate is even more troubling: it is a huge intellectual 
failure. Conceptual debates are enthusiastically and regularly ignored, often receiving the 
theoretical fast at the expense of empirical performance (Johnson 2003, 87). As 
Berenskoetter argues, “most of the time, we take the meaning of our concepts for 
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granted” (2016, 1). Disregarded as meta-theoretical trivia (Rauta 2018), conceptual 
debates are presumed to be resolved by fiat or within political theory and philosophy 
(Schedler 2010), often resulting in “a dialogue de sourds” (emphasis in original, Kibrik 
2021, 2). While in the clearest form not the most significant theoretical battlefield, 
conceptual debates are not unimportant (Diehl 2002, 13). They are about knowledge 
structures, regimes, praxis, communication, and transmission of how we think about 
what counts. They take stock of the origins and diversity of sites of knowledge, and 
present options for how to bridge some, abandon others, and potentially find new ones. 
They offer a theoretical starting point (Kalyvas 2005, 94) and “are needed to construct 
theories” (Berenskoetter 2017, 152) because “they enable us to intellectually frame issues 
and formulate theories in the first place” (Berenskoetter 2016, 1). At the same time, they 
provide clarity and comparative precision and “stand to correct theoretical and metho-
dological ambivalences” (Rauta 2018, 449). In short, concepts and their debates are 
“critical to the functioning and evolution of social science” (Gerring 1999, 359) and 
“without solid conceptual foundations, the edifice of political science is insecure” 
(Schedler 2010).
In spite of the intellectual advantages brought by a thorough conceptual debate, recent 
discussions about contemporary war and warfare have succumbed to a conceptual 
malaise which has led to a general state of conceptual envelopment or entrapment. The 
former refers to what Ucko and Marks described as the “emergence of new – and not so 
new – terms to describe today’s messy realities, starting with the re-discovery of insur-
gency and counterinsurgency in the late 2000s (in an ill-defined relationship with terror-
ism and counter-terrorism) and leading, more recently, to discussion of hybrid threats 
and gray-zone operations” (emphasis in original 2018, 207). The latter describes 
Kilcullen’s observation that policymakers and academics alike have reached a situation 
in which an adversary’s conception of war becomes so much broader than their own 
through subsequent flawed mischaracterisations of war and warfare (2020, 175–176). In 
short, we have over-conceptualised to the point of out-conceptualising ourselves. Some of 
the recent thinking about naming and typologising manifestations of political violence 
has largely taken place in the absence of concept analysis (Rauta 2021a), by ignoring its 
approaches and traditions (Berenskoetter 2017), and by reducing conceptual complexity 
to trendy terminologies to such an extent that we are “conceptually under-equipped to 
grasp, let alone counter, violent political challenges” (Ucko and Marks 2018, 208).
This article evaluates this broader problem by providing a conceptual critique of the 
notion of “remote warfare,” around which this special issue is organised. In the 
Introduction to this special issue, my co-editors and I cast “remote warfare” as a 
moderately useful buzzword, one still trying to find its footing (Biegon et al. 2021). As 
one of the latest arrivals in the ever-expanding vocabulary of the study of political 
violence, “remote warfare” has contributed to a democratisation of the debate around 
war and warfare by appealing to the practitioner, policy, think tank, and academic worlds 
in some shape or form, thereby permitting an intellectual exchange relatively uncon-
strained by each worlds’ modus operandi. Take for example Alyn Smith, MP for Stirling, 
whose bill on the prohibition of the use of lethal autonomous weapons, transparency in 
arms exports and the use of drones and other remote weapons praised the work of think 
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tanks such as the Oxford Research Group, Article 36, and the Campaign to Stop Killer 
Robots. This speaks, even if anecdotally, to our effort in the Introduction to find utility in 
the buzzword quality of “remote warfare.”
Nevertheless, for “remote warfare” to make significant strides, its proponents need to 
engage with the notion’s intellectual infrastructure, and in this way engage in the wider 
debate on how we think about political violence. On the one hand, if concepts on/for/ 
about political violence are signalling devices with which one might describe, assess, and 
then counsel on successful strategies in contemporary warfare, then the “remote warfare” 
debate must overcome its reluctance to justify its relevance and demonstrate awareness of 
its conceptual limitations.1 In short, it should own its past and present errors. On the 
other hand, an unwillingness to do so should have us question, in the words of Regina 
George quoted at the start of the article, why some are trying to make “remote warfare” 
happen. Specifically, “why contribute to conceptual proliferation at a time when we are 
assailed with various notions” (Waldman 2018, 183), when there is little excuse, theore-
tically at least, for us to ignore one another’s vocabularies?
The article proceeds as follows. It develops a framework of analysis that leverages 
recent developments in concept analysis with an emphasis on the relations of meaning 
within the semantic field of contemporary warfare. This is applied to reveal two pathways 
of conceptual emergence: first, conceptual returnism and its logic of comparative con-
textualisation; and, second, conceptual reinvention and its logic of terminological innova-
tion. Against this background, it provides a conceptual assessment of “remote warfare.” It 
shows that there is something fractal about the debate on “remote warfare,” between its 
grand scope, the obvious intension-extension tensions, and its limited deliverables, 
which, taken together, invite this article’s critique. In doing so, the article is not interested 
in discrediting this emerging research agenda on “remote warfare” – there is a strong 
likelihood it will move forward self-referentially following a sunk cost logic. Rather, it 
follows Wilkens and Kessler’s understanding that a debate’s shortcomings and biases “are 
important and productive” (2021). As such, a critical engagement with the debate’s 
central concept provides the benefits of reflection and re-examination for its future 
development.
Thinking conceptually about war and warfare
Concept analysis and semantic fields
MacMillan recently argued that “we must, more than ever, think about war” (2020, 289), 
and a cursory glance at recent research on war reveals how much we have come to know 
on inter-state or intra-state conflict, as well as the causes and processes that account for 
and sustain them. Regardless of theoretical and methodological preferences, this research 
advanced, progressed, and cumulated from a simple baseline: the existence of some 
category of war or warfare as non-negotiable, making war a pressing, observable, and 
analysable issue. For some research clusters such as conflict research, aside from some of 
the above-mentioned ambiguities, the conceptual demarcation lines were clear inasmuch 
as they traced “standard” state and non-state types of conflict: intra-, inter-, extra-, etc.
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Yet, the expansion of our knowledge of war across international relations, security, 
and strategic studies came with an expansion of the categories of war or warfare under 
observation, sometimes driven by trends, events, and policy, sometimes galvanised 
around it labels – fashionable/in vogue – and sometimes powered by the not-so-covert 
dynamics of professional recognition. These overlapped, competed, and tried to super-
sede one another in what is referred to as the wider semantic field, while being pushed 
and pulled through the extra-linguistic forces of the discursive field (the ideas, images, 
and practices of their use by agents and their audiences and their joint negotiation of 
meaning in context) (Berenskoetter 2016, 7; Wilkens and Kessler 2021). Both are key 
notions in concept analysis, yet rarely acknowledged and theorised – an unsurprising 
condition given that even the notion of “concept” itself is rarely questioned (Ophir 
2018, 59).
This sub-section expands on recent work in concept analysis focusing on semantic 
fields as the background against which our conceptual knowledge of war and warfare has 
expanded – with the notion of “discursive field” taking a secondary place in the article’s 
analysis, as its ability to link a concept’s employment and performance requires an 
altogether different focus. The relevance of this interdisciplinary approach to concept 
analysis as applied to the study of contemporary conflict and/or international security 
should not be understated, nor qualified as “too left field.” In fact, it has been a growing 
inter-disciplinary research avenue: Futter (2018) discusses “cyber semantics” in an effort 
to reach better policy formulation in the information age, while a recent paper located 
“proxy wars” in the semantic field of military intervention as a clearly indirect sub-type 
(Rauta 2021a).
With this in mind, the notion of “semantic field” is an import into political science 
from a branch of linguistics, semantics, which focuses on the study of meaning commu-
nicated through language (Goddard 1999, 1; Finch 2000, 142; Sartori 2009a, 97). In 
semantics, “semantic field” has been defined as a domain of relevant words in specific 
areas (Goddard 1999, 43), and Eco argues that “semantic fields give shape to the units of a 
given culture and establish portions of the world vision belonging to that culture” (1977, 
76). The notion’s intellectual heritage goes back to the seminal work of Ferdinand de 
Saussure, who argued that words are linked to other words in the same language, like a 
cell in a network (Allan 2001, 258). As such, concept analysis employing the notion of 
“semantic field” and its ability to link together neighbouring concepts adopts a structur-
alist framework, the essence of which is that “the meaning of any word is actually 
constituted by the totality of relationships this word has with the other words in the 
language” (Goddard 1999, 9).
Within the existing traditions of concept analysis, “semantic field” is most commonly 
associated with what Berenskoetter calls “the scientific approach,” pioneered by Sartori’s 
work on concepts in political science. Across Sartori’s scholarship, “semantic field” is 
defined, first, as “a set of independent-interdependent terms, [. . .], which represent the 
conceptual structure, or the conceptual framework of a given field” (2009a, 92). Second, it 
is conceived as “[a] manageable breakdown and the most meaningful subunit of a whole 
linguistic system” (2009a, 102). Third, and more expansively, it comes to reference
548 V. RAUTA
[. . .] a clustering of terms such that each of its component elements interacts with all the 
others, and, [. . .], is altered by any alteration of the others. In other words, a semantic field 
consists of a set of associated, neighbouring terms that hang together under the following 
test: when one term is redefined, the other terms or some other terms also need to be 
redefined (2009b, 124).
Sartori identifies the semantic field as an area in which concepts occupy semantic 
space, the boundaries of which are determined by the concepts’ relations to each other. 
He underscores this by developing a family of terms connected to “semantic field” which 
are deployed at various stages in his work. Overall, his treatment of the matter is similar 
to one of the most famous assessments in lexical semantics about word relations by Firth: 
“you shall know a word by the company it keeps” (1957, 11), and importantly, Sartori’s 
arguments are not without criticisms, the most important of which being their excessive 
naturalism (Bevir and Kedar 2008, 509).
For the purposes of this article, “semantic field,” therefore, refers to the intellectual 
playground hosting the clustering of terms used to identify a set of problems. It is “a 
group of terms and symbols that relate to each other in a particular way” (Berenskoetter 
2016, 6). In a semantic field, the component elements interact and are altered “by any 
alteration of the others” (Sartori 2009b, 124), leading to an intellectual (pre)-condition of 
defining a concept “only in terms of its ‘place’ in relations to other concepts in its web” 
(Somers 1995, 136). Basically, if one concept changes, all others in the field change as “the 
movement of one piece will suffice to change all the relationships of the system” (Eco 
1977, 76). This is because the semantic field is the space “in which a concept’s meaning is 
mutually constituted in definitions, through an active process of assembling semantic 
crossovers (shared features) and semantic nuances (properties setting terms apart)” 
(emphasis in original, Rauta 2021a, 7). As Ophir explains, “concepts always appear in 
the plural, connected to each other, in need of each other, crossing, confronting, and 
complementing each other” (2018, 73). In short, the semantic field is where concepts 
hang out.
Against this background, within a semantic field, we can observe different relations of 
meaning between concepts that are relevant to determine when and how notions emerge 
and to assess research accumulation and progress. In a specific way, semantics allows us 
to distinguish equivalence (synonymy), opposition (antinomy), part-whole connection 
(meronymy), subordination (hyponymy), multiple meanings (polysemy), etc. In a gen-
eral and more international relations-friendly way, following Berenskoetter, we can 
distinguish three broad relations: “with supporting concepts which are integral to the 
meaning of our concept [. . .]; with cognate concepts with similar meanings or whose 
meanings correspond with each other and bear what Wittgenstein called a family 
resemblance [. . .]; and with contrasting concepts that are opposite in meaning, sometimes 
even taking the form of counter-concepts [. . .], which relate to and (in)form each other 
through a dialectic” (emphasis added, in Berenskoetter 2016, 6).
As such, we can think of a semantic field as a marketplace and an intellectual battle-
field where incumbent terms are “overthrown” in attempted conceptual coups d’état – in 
ways that subvert or support some of the above-mentioned relations of meaning. The end 
of the Cold War, the first Gulf War, and the rediscovery of intra-state violence in the 
1990s (Kalyvas 2009), came with a wave of new concepts – “revolution in military affairs,” 
“info wars,” “network-centric war,” and several “generations” of war – that peaked with 
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Kaldor’s infamous “new wars” ([1999]/2012). By the end of that decade, however, 
complaints about the problem of competition coinages were in full swing: “virtual war, 
virtuous war, information war, net war, humanitarian war, spectator sport war – strive to 
capture the essence of the transformation” (Carruthers 2001, 673). Since then, the 
semantic field of political violence with an emphasis on war and warfare has been in 
overdrive, expanding almost to saturation point, and in the Introduction to this special 
issue, we listed some examples (Biegon et al. 2021). Yet, this was hardly a complete 
picture, which the following sub-section tries to reconstruct in more depth as a tool to 
identify some common conceptual problems, which, as the paper subsequently shows, 
are also shared by “remote warfare.”
Semantic fields and conceptual quicksands: too many terms, too few concepts
Since the 1990s, the vocabulary with which we have described and analysed war and 
warfare has expanded considerably. A quick review permits us to count non-exhaustively 
the following: “accelerated warfare” (Hayward 2020), “algorithmic warfare/AI warfare” 
(Scharre 2018; Coker 2019; Bellanova et al. 2021), “ambiguous war” (Mumford and 
McDonald 2014), “anthropogenic war” (Merrin 2020), “asymmetric/guerrilla/irregular 
war” (Taber 2002; Arreguín-Toft 2006, 2012; Scheipers 2015), “auxiliary warfare” (Rauta 
2016; Scheipers 2017) “code wars” (Schmidt and Cohen 2013), “cool wars” (Rothkopf 
2013) “composite warfare” (Hartwig 2020), “compound warfare” (Huber 2002), “cosmo-
politan war” (Fabre 2012), “counter-insurgency” (Scheipers 2014), “cyber deterrence/ 
war/warfare/security” (Rid 2012; Gartzke 2013; Futter 2018; Harknett and Smeets 2020; 
Levinson 2020; Arquilla 2021; Borghard and Lonergan 2021), “digital and post-digital 
war” (Merrin 2018; Bousquet 2020a; Merrin and Hoskins 2020; O’Loughlin 2020), 
“drone warfare” (Gilli and Gilli 2016; Boyle 2021; Doctor and Walsh 2021; Theussen 
2021), “electronic warfare” (Adamy 2015), “fake war” (Kriel 2017), “frozen conflicts” 
(Klosek et al. 2021), “high/low-intensity conflict/war/warfare” (Smith 2005), “hybrid 
war” (Hoffman 2009, 2014, 2016; Galeotti 2016; Renz 2016; Almäng 2019), “[new] 
generations of war/warfare” (Hammes 2005; Junio 2009), “genetic warfare” (Biberman 
2021), “grey zone war” (Stoker and Whiteside 2020; Rauta and Monaghan 2021), 
“information warfare” (Hellman and Wagnsson 2017; Golovchenko et al. 2018; Lupion 
2018; Fridman et al. 2019; Jonsson 2019), “like war” (Singer and Brooking 2018), “liminal 
war” (Kilcullen 2020), “limited war” (Freedman 2014) ‘liquid warfare (Demmers and 
Gould 2018), “metro war” (Coker 2015) “mosaic warfare” (Magnuson 2018), “net- 
centric/network warfare” (Niva 2013), “non-linear warfare” (Galeotti 2016), “non- 
obvious war” (Libicki 2012), “non-state warfare” (Biddle 2021), “political warfare” 
(Hoffman 2014; Robinson et al. 2018; Polyakova 2019), “positional warfare” (Kaushal 
2018) “postmodern warfare” (Ehrhart 2017), “proxy wars” (Rauta 2018, 2020a, 2020b, 
2021a, 2021b; Fox 2019, 2020; Groh 2019; Moghadam and Wyss 2020), “revolutionary 
warfare” (Whiteside 2016; Kalyvas 2015), “robot wars” (Singer 2009; Roff 2014; Shaw 
2017), “[global] shadow warfare” (Barno 2014), “semi-proxy wars” (Cragin 2015), “small 
wars” (Barkawi 2004), “society-centric warfare” (Levite and Shimshoni 2018), “space 
warfare” (Bowen 2020), “spectator-sport war” (McInnes 2002), “surrogate warfare” 
(Krieg and Rickli 2018; Rauta et al. 2019; Karagiannis 2021), “uncomfortable wars” 
(Fishel and Manwarin 2006), “unconventional warfare” (Votel et al. 2016), “unrestricted 
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warfare” (Qiao and Wang 1999), “urban warfare” (King 2021), “vicarious warfare” 
(Waldman 2018, 2021). To complicate matters further, all of these war/warfare categories 
sit next to other cognate notions such as “complex political emergencies” (Goodhand and 
Hulme 1999), “comprehensive approach,” the “American/Western way of war” (Marks 
and Bateman 2019), “nation building,” “hyperactive battlefields” (Osborn 2021) “full 
spectrum dominance” (Ryan 2019; Stacey 2020), “omni-/multi-domain” (Perkins 2017), 
“by-with-through” (Cragin 2020), “subversion” (Lee 2020), “war amongst people” 
(Marks and Rich 2017), and the newly re-emphasised “great power war/competition.” 
With this in mind, one wagers the next account will be one telling us that everything is 
warfare.
Clearly, the foundations of the semantic field of political violence have given in to 
some deep conceptual quicksands. What explains this conceptual barrage? To begin with, 
we know that any concept “tends to be attached to a word, although – and this is 
important – not necessarily always to the same word and, as such, is more than a 
word” (Berenskoetter 2016, 4). Nevertheless, does this expansion amount to anything 
beyond terminological overdrive? Is it not a case of too many terms, too few concepts? 
Returning to Berenskoetter’s above-mentioned relations of meaning, we can clearly see 
contrasting relations – conventional/unconventional; regular/irregular; symmetric/ 
asymmetric; low/high-intensity – as well as the predominance of cognate concepts, or, 
simply put, synonyms of various degrees of equivalence: for example, the terms “ambig-
uous,” “non-obvious,” or “shadow” come to identify the same fogginess of warfare; of 
“by-with-through” presented as a politically more palatable “proxy war.”
Then, there are also numerous supporting concepts, those concepts integral to the 
meaning of the concept. This applies to the contentious “hybrid warfare,” in and of itself 
a conceptual system that can easily double as a semantic field, or to “irregular warfare,” 
recently defined as combining information warfare, ambiguous or denied proxy opera-
tions, and subversion (Petit et al. 2021). Similarly, the recently proposed notion of 
“vicarious warfare” is a complex concept – a meronym in semantic terms – that combines 
“delegation,” “danger-proofing,” and “darkness” (Waldman 2018, 2021). In many ways it 
reinvents by mixing “proxy,” “shadow,” “asymmetric,” and “low-intensity warfare” in an 
account that emphasises the tactical advantages of drone warfare as key to the socio- 
political demands for war on the cheap. Krieg and Rickli’s (2018) “surrogate warfare” 
covers pretty much the same intellectual terrain, however with an empirical terrain of 
questionable extension – everything from great power competition and hybrid war to 
artificial intelligence, as well as with a term redolent of the Cold War superpower 
competition.
Therefore, what are the intellectual merits of requalifying war and warfare through 
new adjectives when existing terms already do the job? Why observe a war-related 
process, for example, delegation of war to rebels, through countless alternatives when 
they mean the same and existing terms are already in place? What do we gain by getting 
lost in this maze of jargon? More importantly, can we get out? This latter question is 
relevant inasmuch as it also points to the problem of conceptual proliferation in the 
absence of conceptual analysis and its broader consequences on knowledge cumulation 
and even erasure. And, more broadly, two twin considerations deserve our attention: 
first, what has happened within the study of contemporary war and warfare for it to be so 
many not-so-different things at the same time? And, second, do these concepts map onto 
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policy imperatives? These are pressing matters to consider at a time of conceptual flux for 
transatlantic military policy and strategy with implications “for how states envision the 
character of conflict shapes how they plan and prepare for war, from defence policy to 
procurement and from doctrine to training” (German 2019, 759). Currently, the United 
States military is in the process of overhauling its joint war-fighting concept after it failed 
recent wargames (Copp 2021), while the United Kingdom is trying to make sense of the 
direction of Global Britain in the context of its recent Integrated Review and France is 
walking away from the Sahel and preparing for high-intensity warfare (The Economist 
2021).
These questions invite some observations relevant to the aims of the article of offering 
a critique of “remote warfare” because they set the background against which the notion 
has emerged. They also address the first aim of the article, which is to discuss the state of 
conceptual malaise through the analytical utility of the notion of “semantic field” and its 
dynamics. More importantly, as mentioned previously, they help locate some problems 
with “remote warfare” which can largely be excused as a function of the politics of 
concept development or understood as part of the generally poor practices of concept 
engagement in international relations and security/strategic studies, which – to reiterate 
– is widely acknowledged and only recent work has started to rectify this problem 
(Wilkens and Kessler 2021).
Observation I – “A normal state of affairs”
Counter-intuitively, up to a certain extent, the current state affairs is a normal state of 
affairs. This is because all these terms seek to say something about an inherently troubled 
root concept – political violence. We now know that political violence is “a genuinely 
multifaceted and varied phenomenon” (Kalyvas 2019, 11), complicated by the fact that it 
“has always been, the essence of politics” (Bufacchi 2005, 193). Moreover, it is acknowl-
edged as “an exceedingly broad and ill-defined term” whose meaning and contents “can 
be stretched almost infinitely” (Kalyvas 2019, 12). Therefore, if the central problem under 
observation is itself “a conceptual minefield” (Kalyvas 2006, 19), then attempts at 
disaggregating its empirical manifestations conceptually and theoretically are bound to 
inherit some of these tensions.
Second, this generalised tendency towards over-conceptualisation is a function of the 
changes through which the study of political violence and its forms has gone, as well how 
it has adapted to big policy shifts or driven by events – the interest in guerrilla warfare in 
the 1960s during the Kennedy administration’s preoccupation with Vietnam; in terror-
ism and counterinsurgency after 9/11; or the more recent resurgence of great power 
politics with the rise of China. Take the case of “war,” for example: on the one hand, we 
have observed a series of remarkable intellectual shifts: (1) from the study of aggregate 
indicators of instability to “disaggregating the broad category of political violence into 
different types of violent activity” (Boyle 2012, 527); (2) from a single level of analysis to 
an emphasis on integrating and even going beyond micro–macro-level linkages and 
towards integrated frameworks refocusing the study of civil war violence on the armed 
politics that drive and support it (Staniland 2017); and (3) towards the more refined 
sociological study of war as an alternative to accounts informed by narrow variables 
(Malešević 2017, 457). On the other hand, we have been confronted with robust, and 
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diametrically opposed, claims that the study of war has been so neglected that it remains, 
actually, entirely absent. “Why then does the Anglo-American academy lack a discipline 
of ‘war studies’?” asked Barkawi and Brighton (2011, 127). Elsewhere, Barkawi decried 
the “breakdown in the dialogue between the study of security and knowledge about war, a 
breakdown that is neither appreciated nor mourned” (2011, 702), and invited scholars to 
embark upon a critical study of the phenomenon of war, with Aradau (2012) picking up 
the gauntlet and offering an integrated middle-ground between the study of security and 
war, and Bousquet et al. presenting, more recently, a research agenda for the study of war 
grounded in martial empiricism by way of “embracing war’s incessant becoming” 
(2020b).
These tensions reverberate powerfully into an assessment of this conceptual overdrive 
as normal. First, they betray an acknowledgement that “if war is as old as humanity itself, 
so too is the human effort to define and control it, differentiating warfare from other 
forms of violence and conflict and establishing rules to govern and constrain it” (Brooks 
2017, 170). In short, conceptualising organised forms of political violence has been 
around since time immemorial and is the expected first step of theorising. Second, and 
linked to this, is the recognition of the fact that “the organising role of conceptual 
categories is not only classificatory but also constitutive: unless we can say what we are 
examining, we cannot relate anything to anything else” (Humphreys 2011, 263). 
Therefore, it is an essential precondition, which draws the borders of the empirical 
phenomenon under observation. Third, this endeavour implies language choices that 
are subject to change: “the words commonly used to signify a concept may remain the 
same while the meaning and use of the concept change dramatically. Furthermore, often 
there will be a number of words or terms for one concept, while at other times certain 
concepts will not yet have any signifying word” (Martin 1997, 420). Finally, this demar-
cation is in equal parts semantic and symbolic, with concepts being part of language, and 
as such intersubjective (Guzzini 2005, 498). Recognising these four assumptions is 
categorically important because it frames the article’s discussion of the current concep-
tual malaise with an important caveat: the unassailable intellectual prerogative of con-
ceptual choice over phenomena inherently difficult to distinguish and classify, coupled 
with the invisibility of the epistemological commitments on which scholars might rely 
and might remain hidden to the article’s framework (Eagleton-Pierce 2011, 805).
Observation II – “A not so normal state of affairs”
However, aside from this set of explanations accounting for a certain degree of normalcy, 
the following observations identify a “not-so-normal” state of affairs. In doing so, the 
article draws on the above clarification of the notion of “semantic field” and focuses on 
how concepts emerge and relate to one another in the process, while providing some 
tentative answers to the questions above in line with the first aim of the paper, while 
setting the scene for the second aim of the paper, namely the conceptual critique of 
“remote warfare.” To this end, this sub-section distinguishes between two modes of 
conceptual emergence, each with its own logic: first, conceptual returnism and its logic of 
comparative contextualisation; and second, conceptual reinvention and its logic of termi-
nological innovation.
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Heng argued that scholars continually revisit their traditional notions and often fall in 
the trap of returnism: “it can refer to the persistent rehashing of notions [. . .] but it can 
also likewise describe the persistence of, and desire to return to familiar ways of thinking 
and assumptions” (2010, 540). Deibert called it the process of making the familiar 
unfamiliar again (1997). The article draws on this idea and argues that conceptual 
returnism describes the most common approach to the development of new concepts: 
reinterpretation of existing concepts by relocating their conceptual schema – “term” and 
“features” – onto a manifestation of an empirical phenomenon in a new context, both 
intellectual and socio-political. As McAllister Linn remarked about concepts in American 
military thought, returnism is cyclical with terms “being heralded as revolutionary or 
‘transformational,’ then quickly going out of fashion, only to re-emerge under a new 
rubric a decade or so later” (2011, 34). Quite often, conceptual returnism is marked by 
prefixes such as “neo-” or “post-” or through adjectives of gradable or scalar qualification 
such as “new” or “semi.” The “new wars” thesis and its current disrepute is a case in 
point.
More recently, the same can be said by the use of “new Cold War” to describe both US- 
Russia and US-China relations. On the one hand, it has been used to argue that “the 
Kremlin has launched a strategy of political warfare against the West in the form of 
disinformation campaigns, support for far-right political parties in Europe, cyberattacks, 
money laundering, and other tools of influence that allow Moscow to undermine its 
perceived adversaries at very little cost” (Polyakova 2019). On the other hand, such 
assessments grew after former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev argued at the 2016 
Munich Security Conference that “we are sliding, in fact, into a period of a new Cold 
War” and former leader of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev, cautioned that the world is on 
the brink of a new Cold War that “has already begun” (in Rotaru 2019). Naturally, 
scholars followed, the essence of this Cold War II is supposedly the Chinese and Russian 
resistance to American hegemony (Lind 2018), an inappropriate assessment rooted in 
mutually flawed attempts at reviving ghosts of the past “to cope with frightening 
presents” (Lieven 2018, 128). This evidences, even if partly, the logic of comparative 
contextualisation behind conceptual returnism, where analogy functions to (mis)-inform 
conceptual choices.
Nevertheless, conceptual returnism also takes place in the absence of such qualifiers. 
Some of the concepts listed above have come back stronger than the 1990s trend from 
which they originated. As early as 1998, the Defense Department was alerted to the 
realities of cyber-attacks with John Hamre, the then Deputy Secretary of Defense, 
informing Congress that the US was “in the middle of a cyberwar” following repeated 
attacks by the Russian Federation on key military and intelligence infrastructure (in 
Sanger 2018, 13). And the gravitational pull of 1990s scholarship applies also to “infor-
mation warfare” (Libicki 1995; Harknett 1996; Feaver 1998; Thayer 2000), “network 
warfare” (Cebrowski and Garstka 1998), “non-linear warfare,” “political warfare,” and 
“generational assessments of warfare” (Lind et al. 1989). “Proxy war” has been re- 
conceptualised away from its antecedent usages (Moghadam and Wyss 2018; Rauta 
2018, 2021a; Fox 2019, 2020) to such an extent that assessing contemporary proxy wars 
as being of Cold War vintage simply amounts to a deliberately perfunctory reading of the 
literature. Some concepts have been reconstructed genealogically in intellectually refined 
ways, as is the case with “mercenary warfare” (Riemann 2021) or “auxiliary warfare” 
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(Scheipers 2015). Finally, several concepts have returned, either narrowed or expanded in 
meaning. For example, “information warfare” has recently been used as a placeholder for 
analyses of Russian disinformation (Golovchenko et al. 2018). Conversely, the problems 
emerging in the cyber domain saw the notion go beyond questions of whether cyber war 
will take place or not, and actually becoming a semantic field itself with an array of terms 
trying to make sense of its complexity: from war/warfare/security/threats to governance/ 
crime/terrorism. Futter called this “cyber semantics” (2018), and Branch (2021) sketched 
the foundational metaphors through which cybersecurity language became entrenched in 
the United States military thinking.
Conceptual reinvention, however, is premised on a reinterpretation of existing con-
cepts by replacing part of their conceptual schema, the “term,” in an effort that at best 
innovates linguistically, but not conceptually. Conceptual reinvention amounts to reas-
signing properties and features of existing concepts under new labels. Terminology- 
driven conceptual reinvention identifies the demands placed by the appeal of logo-centric 
language on knowledge and knowledge production. Many of the notions listed above are 
terms attached to concepts “in the same way that price tags are attached to goods” 
(Wilkens and Kessler 2021), and, quite clearly, the label machine has been in full tilt over 
the last few decades. To return to the previous example, the study of proxy wars presents 
ample evidence for this problem. Over the last decade, proxy wars have been essentially 
reinvented in search of knowledge gaps in spite of the fact that all this research talked 
about the issue of the external support/sponsorship/backing of armed non-state actors in 
the context of terrorism or insurgencies: “semi-proxy wars,” “third-party proxies,” 
“proxy alliances,” and more recently “by-with-through,” “surrogate warfare,” and “sub-
version.” As Fox aptly puts it, some of these serve to “soften or hide the coarseness of 
proxy warfare” (2019, 1; Fox 2020), and others to offer politically acceptable narratives to 
flawed counterinsurgency campaigns. So terminology is not just a meta-theoretical 
problem, but a political one too. The latter is exemplified by recent American efforts to 
label its support of rebels in COIN theatres as strategically productive partnerships – “by- 
with-through” – in contrast to the malign search for strategic depth of inimical states – 
Iran – essentially engaged in the same type of action: different degrees of airpower 
combined with a mix of covert and overt support for armed non-state actors. Yet, 
curiously, one scenario sees trustworthy partners and allies, the other pernicious proxies. 
No wonder then that Rondeaux and Sterman remarked that “a lack of clarity as to what is 
meant by ‘proxy warfare’ and what qualifies a useful proxy strategy [. . .] have been on 
display since the 9/11 attacks” (2019, 11).
Away from the particular case of proxy wars, the terminological innovation behind 
conceptual reinvention often privileges the lowering of the barrier of entry to the debate 
by shifting the focus onto analytical compartmentalisation. This is something shared with 
conceptual returnism and accounts for some standard conceptual problems. First, there 
is conceptual stretching, leading to concepts having too many empirical issues to con-
tribute to the cumulation of knowledge. This is the classic Sartorian problem of the 
ladder of abstraction (1970, 1034), and this was covered when discussing “vicarious” and 
“surrogate” warfare, but it applies to a great number of notions. It is important to note 
that conceptual stretching also presents the challenge of distinguishing between 
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deliberately complex notions that cluster issues within their internal structure precisely 
because they seek to observe the interconnectedness between the constituent terms, i.e. 
“vicarious” or “hybrid warfare.”
Second, conceptual borrowing occurs from within and across disciplines, and is more 
prominent with concepts emphasising technological developments. The majority of these 
concepts travel across disciplines with their vocabulary leading to different degrees of 
impenetrability of the resultant debate. At the same time, they challenge the ability to take 
long views of a concept’s history, resulting in unclear, overlapping categories, and a 
tendency towards facile dismissal of concepts as anachronistic or context bound. For 
example, Bilms remarked recently that “irregular warfare has an image problem [. . . and] 
needs a new market strategy that shakes these misconceptions” (2021), whereas “the 
phrase [proxy war] gets tossed around too carelessly” (Beehner 2015). But more impor-
tantly, it leads into a third conceptual problem: the development of vague, ambiguous, 
poorly defined concepts whose contradictions are deemed resolvable by appealing to 
their essential contestability (Gallie 1955). The core of the issue is the reluctance to 
outline robust conceptual schemas integrating necessary and sufficient attributes that 
distinguish the concept and allow it to leverage its analytical uniqueness in a meaningful 
way vis-à-vis existing terms. The resulting definitions are, therefore, stipulatively mini-
mal and a bird’s eye view of the semantic field of contemporary warfare permits us to 
distinguish between categories of terms on the basis of the property they seek to 
emphasise and what they seek to observe: (1) outcomes-focused notions – “ambiguous 
warfare,” “frozen wars,” “revolutionary warfare,” “subversion” or “vicarious warfare”; (2) 
process-oriented notions – “asymmetric/irregular/guerrilla warfare,” “low/high-intensity 
warfare,” “gradient warfare,” “limited warfare” or “protracted warfare”; (3) tool-centric 
terms – “algorithmic warfare,” “code wars,” “like wars,” or “robot wars”; (4) actor-centric 
terms – “auxiliary warfare,” “proxy warfare,” or “surrogate warfare”; (5) domain-focused 
notions – “cyber warfare,” “digital war,” “electronic warfare,” “hybrid war,” “mosaic 
warfare,” or “space warfare”; (6) context-affirming notions – “anthropogenic war,” 
“cosmopolitan warfare,” “liquid warfare,” or “post-modern warfare.”
Some of these terminological templates have been pushed enthusiastically as harbin-
gers of new and ground-breaking research agendas conflating units and levels of analysis, 
quickly becoming lost in a definitional morass resulting from repeated semantic borrow-
ing and conditioned by the more recent pressure of research impact. Whether returning 
or reinvented, the resulting situation makes a case for what Gates called “next-war-itis” 
(2009) whose pre-existing condition was the absence of some form of semantic respon-
sibility. Aside from this, several of these terms-masquerading-as-concepts are caught in a 
cause-effect loop, contributing and being affected by the general tendency to think of the 
semantic field of political violence as a browser, a search engine in which one can scroll 
indefinitely until one finds a suitable concept. Therefore, a look at the wider semantic 
field points to the collective disinterest, at least, and inability, at most, to think theore-
tically about the concepts we design to make sense of the empirical problems under 
observation. At the same time, it invites a broader conversation about the degree to which 
the wider discipline reproduces and rewards knowledge positioning and research rele-
vance through vacuous concept development. Specifically, if we institutionalise labels as 
conceptual novelty and intellectual breakthroughs, then we no longer ask key questions: 
what is wrong with the current concepts? What do alternatives bring? How much of this 
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branding is, in fact, false advertising? As the next sub-section shows, the “remote 
warfare” debate has played directly into this, eschewing answers to these questions yet 
pretending to disrupt established lines of inquiry “even when substantive concerns 
remain essentially the same” (Schedler 2010).
Remote warfare – the little concept that couldn’t
As discussed, if the semantic field of contemporary war/warfare is troubled by sudden 
tectonic shifts of meaning, this is a function of the degree to which scholars pursue new 
concepts defined on a universe of trendy events, policy shifts, and searches for profes-
sional recognition. Against this background, this section examines the contribution of 
“remote warfare” to this overall state of semantic confusion, appreciating the endogeneity 
presently at work for “remote warfare” and all other concepts: they contribute to and are 
shaped by these dynamics in equal measure. The article argues that “remote warfare” is 
far from a robust concept and that the intellectual record stacks against the notion. The 
charge sheet against “remote warfare” is long inasmuch as it has achieved the remarkable 
feat of being a terminological newcomer yet instantly becoming an overused cliché – a 
reason why the Introduction to this special issue placed it on a delicate balance between a 
useful buzzword and a disquieting buzzkill. This section makes two arguments. First, 
there is a lack of clarity over what “remote warfare” entails: namely, the debate is yet to 
explain what it is, with a paper in this special issue making a first attempt at explaining 
why this is the case by providing a nuanced breakdown of meanings of remoteness, albeit 
discussing the public consumption of warfare instead of the production of warfare (Watts 
and Biegon 2021). Second, that because of this lack of definitional specificity, we also lack 
an account of its analytical value: specifically, what intellectual leverage does it hold over 
existing terms making similar claims?
What isn’t “Remote warfare”?
Sartori’s proposed system of concept analysis carefully distinguishes between term and 
concept. Much of the discussion presented so far stressed this difference between the term 
one selects and the concept one ends up refining through the set of properties assigned to 
the term. As Sartori explains, “when we settle for a given term (the term that designates 
the concept) our selection has a semantic projection, and this means [. . .] that our choice 
entails a way of conceiving and perceiving (things or processes)” (2009b, 124). The 
“remote warfare” debate has largely focused on the supposed novelty of the term at the 
expense of the concept. In doing so, it has fallen into a trap: it assumed, contrary to the 
logic of concept formation, that “the meaning of concept [. . .] is the meaning of the word 
[. . .] by which it is expressed” (Oppenheim 1975, 286). As a consequence, there has been 
a lot of buzz about remote warfare – as explained in the Introduction to the special issue – 
without much emphasis on what it is, what it tries to explain, and what properties it seeks 
to establish as a system of meaning under the term “remote warfare.” The result is a lot of 
ventriloquist verbiage that uses “remote warfare” or “remoteness” by borrowing con-
ceptual properties from the literatures of the phenomena it submits for analysis under its 
always expanding empirical remit, as well as from the sub-fields in which it has been 
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studied, i.e. law (Ohlin 2017a, 2017b) or cultural studies (Adelman and Kieran 2020). 
“Remote warfare” is, therefore, merely a term which rents its meaning from the set of 
problems it observes.
The debate does a poor job of explaining what happens to a problem – war, warfare, 
etc. – when it is qualified as “remote.” Biegon and Watts argue that “noun ‘warfare’ is 
qualified by the adjective ‘remote’ precisely to imply that, for its architects, the violence of 
war-fighting (and its socio-political impact) is to be geographically and politically ‘dis-
tanced’ from the state that said planners are nominally responsible for defending” (2020). 
In the clearest way, this applies to military intervention writ large and says nothing 
specifically about this form of warfare. Perhaps, such explanations should take note from 
Waldman’s robust reasoning behind “vicarious warfare”: “the defining characteristic of 
vicariousness is the attempt by societies . . . to loosen or untether the cords that bound the 
practice of war to its manifold costs and requirements while still seeking to reap its 
potential rewards” (2021).
As determinants, adjectives collocate to narrow/broaden meaning, to identify by 
specification, or to help classification. We might want a new label for precision or to 
“zoom” into a problem’s sub-types. We name things because we want them to be seen as 
something, and to make a set of observations starting from the property/characteristic 
which we are trying to isolate. So what is meant by “remote”? Is it a matter of distance, 
closeness, or dispersion? And to what does this apply? “Remote” is an adjective of “place,” 
“locus,” or “space” that has been used to discuss direction or positionality: how far from? 
Its essence is locative, almost cartographic. From above, the literature opens a discussion 
that does not define, to begin with, what it means by “war” or “warfare,” then expands its 
foci indefinitely (thus covering everything from military assistance to artificial intelli-
gence). This is largely a function of its embrace of “complexity” as an intellectual 
prerogative, which is treated as a blank check on conceptual clarification.
One of the paradoxes of “remote warfare” is that it legitimises its existence through the 
intractability of twenty-first-century security challenges, expanding its extension to 
include everything from great power competition to artificial intelligence, and then, 
reducing this very complexity to a debate about “distance” as the shift in today’s types 
of wars or warfare. This is troubling, first, because the core role of a concept is to function 
as a device used “to order and make sense of a messy reality by reducing its complexity 
naming and giving meaning to its features” (Berenskoetter 2016, 1). And second, because 
it falls into what Gray called the “temptation to misread recent and contemporary trends 
in warfare as signals of some momentous, radical shift” (2005, 15). As Waldman argues, 
“it is perhaps quixotic to expect any single term to capture the complexity of reality” 
(2018, 182), and there are few discussions on contemporary war and warfare which do 
not set the scene by telling the audience something trite about complexity. Or, for that 
matter, something about pessimistic change, uncertainty of dawns of new eras, and the 
erosion of whatever order one might seek to favour or uphold. However, “remote 
warfare” doubles – even “triples” – down on this issue, in spite of the fact that to say 
“international security is complex” is “trivially true, and does not offer any particular 
insight into international processes” (Gunitsky 2013, 36). Because of this, “remote 
warfare” is at the same time a way of fighting, a mode of intervention, the future of 
wars, a mode of consuming and visualising warfare, a new domain of battle, and a 
measure of how the legal/ethical conduct of war has succumbed to techno-dominance. 
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Therefore, under the rubric “remote warfare” we see so much, we end up seeing almost 
nothing clearly. Even if Ohlin argues that its nature is “the elephant in the room” (2017a, 
2), as a term, “remote warfare” does not provide insights into the characteristics of what 
might make this phenomenon intelligible.
Because “remote warfare” literature places so much weight on its central adjective, it 
does not pay close attention to what would turn the term into a concept: a robust 
description of its constituent properties and how these are configured to give meaning. 
What does “remote warfare” stipulate? What are its key dimensions? What is the 
conceptual structure to which they contribute? At times, we are provided with spurious 
“listings” of uses of “remote warfare” as placeholders for adequate conceptual history, 
which prove useful at best to get a sense of the many entry points into the discussion 
(Watts and Biegon 2021). Beyond this, “remote warfare” has been defined in vague ways 
and usually as “[an] approach used by states to counter threats at a distance” (Watson 
and McKay et al. 2021, 7), while the defunct Oxford Research Group argued that it 
“describes approaches to combat that do not require the deployment of large numbers of 
your own ground troops” (Knowles and Watson 2018a, 2). The first one is deficiently 
vague inasmuch as it presents no specification of what is meant by approach, and the 
second one qualifies “remote warfare” as reduced military intervention. McDonald’s 
argument in this special issue compares existing definitions and shows the extent to 
which they are incompatible with one another, so this issue need not be re-litigated here 
(2021).
All of this returns to the drone literature-heavy anchorage of the “remote warfare” 
debate (Chapa 2021; Graae and Maure 2021). It creates a baseline in which distance is an 
enabler, condition, and context of war and warfare. Why this literature has been reified 
and how to deal with this issue is best left to remote warfare scholars. Yet, to make some 
conceptual progress, several avenues can be considered. First, what if “remote” was 
placed on a spectrum of distance: as boundary, as cleavage, as difference, as disconnect, 
yet also as connection? This would speak to what Watts and Biegon argue in this special 
issue, namely approaching “remoteness as a continuum; as a fluid and changeable 
process, imbued with contingency, rather than an objective, ‘either/or’ condition deter-
mined exclusively by the physical space between various agents and places” (2021). 
Second, what if distance was thought of as an expression of position from which one 
can think of instrumentality, mechanisms, and processes? Third, this could then translate 
into thinking about what unique set of characteristics a problem might share when 
observed as “remote warfare.” Finally, there is the argument presented in this special 
issue by McDonald (2021), namely that “remote warfare” should not be thought of as a 
category or warfare.
However the debate might want to move forward, these issues matter because the 
current absence of conceptual properties translates directly into what “remote warfare” 
comes to reference empirically. In short, across the debate, the term hops across empiri-
cal lily pads from military assistance to partner armies, to private military companies, to 
counter-terrorism, and applications of artificial intelligence in warfare. At the same time, 
wars in Libya, Syria, Yemen, counter-terrorist campaigns in Somalia, or counter-insur-
gency operations in the Sahel have been labelled “remote warfare” – in this special issue, 
see Stoddard and Toltica (2021); elsewhere, see McKay et al. (2021) for an edited volume 
in which “remote warfare” is everything on the horizon, naturally disguised as 
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“interdisciplinarity.” The literature has been telescoping past, present and future from a 
curious vantage point: some relationship to manifestations of distance. But this does not 
remove the core of the problem: “trying to connect a diverse range of conflicts and 
political actors purely on the basis of their tactical similarity provides a poor, even non- 
existent, foundation upon which to explicate a particular military phenomenon” (Smith 
2005, 36–37). What happens to context specificity? What happens to local factors, 
dynamics, or strategic cultures? These issues are glossed over, and, what is more, we 
are invited to assume that this empirical aggregation validates the use of the term within 
the semantic field of contemporary warfare (Watts and Biegon 2021). The folly of this 
argument can be reduced to Sartori’s description of the “Hegelian night in which all the 
cows look black (and eventually the milkman is taken for a cow)” (1970, 1040).
Even more troubling, these assessments retroactively consider events, processes, or 
cases – chiefly of which military interventions – through the lens of “remote warfare” in 
the absence of evident links. The same applies to Trenta’s (2021) discussion in this special 
issue on assassination, which adds assassination to the analytical mix in an empirical 
assessment that bends contextualisation ever so slightly. For a debate that is supposedly 
so anchored in the present and ambitious about the future, the remote warfare argument 
is curiously anachronistic. In fact, in focusing so much on distance as space and speed, it 
entirely forgets to account for the temporal dimension (both in the practice of warfare it 
tries to describe and in the historiographical situation of this practice). The debate needs 
reminding that just because preference is given to a term, it does not mean it can re-write 
events under said term by appealing to some flawed logic of the benefits of hindsight. 
Even in this special issue, “remote warfare” is elastically expanded or contracted in ways 
that see it discussed as or linked to assassination (Trenta 2021), spectatorship of war 
(Watts and Biegon 2021), and Special Forces assistance and training (Riemann and Rossi 
2021a). This elasticity is even extended to the use of the notion to analyse one single 
problem, military intervention. In the case of Watts and Biegon’s paper in this special 
issue, there is a tension behind using “remote warfare” as a process-focused notion that 
is, however, retroactively used to analyse American involvement in the Libyan war as a 
mode of viewership, spectatorship, or consumption of its outcome. This is even more 
problematic given that elsewhere the authors make similar arguments yet define remote 
warfare as security assistance (see McKay et al. 2021, 152–172). If “remote warfare” 
cannot mean the same within one research agenda, what can we say about the broader 
debate?
The problem here is not that “remote warfare” might link these somehow in a 
narrative about the changes in contemporary conflict on its way to becoming a cluster 
concept, or what Heuser called a bureaucratically convenient concept (2010). It is not a 
question of “remote warfare” denoting a combination of some phenomena/problems/ 
domains, as it is the case – albeit imperfectly – with hybrid or vicarious warfare. Rather, it 
is that “remote warfare” is deemed to be all of these empirical problems at the same time, 
indiscriminately, and that this debate takes no exception with its central term being 
almost everything under the security challenges umbrella (again, see McKay et al. 2021). 
In concept analysis language, the broadening of meaning that occurs within the remote 
warfare literature ignores the fact that the relationship between intension and extension 
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is an exchange: the more conceptual properties one adds, the less the empirical domain 
becomes. The reverse applies, as Sartori explains in his canonical analysis: “one’s gains in 
extensional coverage tend to be matched by losses in connotative precision” (1970, 1035).
Moreover, in its hyperbolic attempts at claiming some empirical relevance, “remote 
warfare” is employed as a tool of seeking some form of empirical dominance or at least 
omnipresence in violation of the heuristic value of concepts of not being “considered an 
accurate representation of reality/the world – regardless of the fundamental question of 
whether such representation is possible” (Berenskoetter 2016, 4). As a consequence, the 
“remote warfare” argument makes empirically dubious statements in an effort to position 
itself as “central to modern state-sponsored violence” (Adelman and Kieran 2020, 3) and 
“the most common form of military engagement used by states” (Watson and McKay et 
al. 2021, 7). We know that “concepts are central for understanding and producing social 
reality” (Wilkens and Kessler 2021), so, logically, if one’s concept “picks up” everything 
from the empirical realities of security, then one validates its relevance and prominence 
rather tautologically. This problem demands the debate’s attention urgently because, 
empirically, “remote warfare” falls down Sartori’s ladder of abstraction. Moving forward, 
one can think of the debate working in reverse: trying to establish what the concept is not. 
By drawing a negative space, it can focus on regaining a more stable analytical footing 
because “even the simplest concept requires its other form which it has to be distin-
guished and through which it is negated” (Ophir 2018, 59).
A term, not yet a concept, in search of relevance
In what way do remote warfare scholars offer a realistic conception of the sort of wars 
that are being fought? When compared to other concepts – “hybrid,” “surrogate,” 
“proxy,” and “vicarious warfare” – “remote warfare” offers a curatorial experience of 
the complexity of international security, which, as discussed above, is perfunctory at best. 
“Remote warfare” does not tell the audience much about the monopoly of violence, or for 
that matter about who fights. We are informed about “how” violence might be produced, 
mediated or consumed, and even if one bought into the argument, it is far from ground- 
breaking: the elevation of the tactical advantage of some form/degree of distance to the 
strategic level resulting in a false requalification or reassessment of war itself.
So, to what is “remote warfare” an alternative? “Proxy warfare” is analysed as a mode 
of indirect intervention that tries to make statements about the degrees of closeness – 
formality or informality – of a relationship between an intervening power and the actor 
doing the intervention. Surrogate warfare, however troubled by its Cold War conceptual 
legacy, provides an assessment of replacement of foreign policy options in contemporary 
conflict. “Hybrid warfare” is, to a certain degree, an evaluation of the diversity and 
simultaneous combinations of strategies and tactics. As it has been employed, “remote 
warfare” is conceptually non-competitive. First, this is because it side-lines conceptual 
analysis and picks comparison with selected concepts. If we think about the above- 
mentioned relationships of meaning hosted by a semantic field, “remote warfare” fails 
to become a meronym used to understand classification, and at best can be used as a 
synonym to some of these notions. Biegon and Watts (2020), for example, make an 
argument about remote warfare referencing surrogate and vicarious warfare arguments 
because of their relative hype, side-lining proxy war literature on flawed grounds. Second, 
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this debate undermines cumulation and progress of knowledge. If a problem can be 
identified as something else, then why call it “remote warfare” after all? Ground-breaking 
research is currently being published on Obama’s military intervention in Libya and Syria 
(Rees 2021), on the coercive logic of drone use (Doctor and Walsh 2021), on the effects of 
distance on military intervention and performance (Patrick and Gartzke 2021), and on 
strategic culture and US military intervention (Boyle and Lang 2021). And this is without 
any conceptual reconfiguration of these contexts as “remote warfare” or something else. 
So, what do we gain differently in our analysis by employing “remote warfare”?
The final point is a broader one. Concepts “express and reproduce ontological 
assumptions about what constitutes an object or social phenomenon” (Wilkens and 
Kessler 2021). So what ontological position does “remote warfare” offer? Riemann and 
Rossi take this issue to task in the present special issue (2021a), and elsewhere write 
compellingly about the detachment from the burden of war (2021b). Schulzke notes 
some of these tensions in his analysis of the moral aspects of remote weaponry (2016). 
However, the techno-dominance behind this literature has the unintended effect of 
treating wars as helpless, distant, mediated by the supposedly exceptional condition of 
the otherwise normal geographical distance. If the debate on concepts on contemporary 
warfare tends to dismiss old concepts as contextually irrelevant – see “surrogate warfare” 
for Cold War anchorage – then, as a new term, “remote warfare” should be questioned, at 
least, against the demands it makes of the present. In many ways, “remote warfare” 
reproduces existing narratives that privilege an exculpatory attitude of disengagement. It 
follows the same reductionist description of war: small, distant, and hapless, in faraway 
places, end-less, uncomfortable, or merely quagmires. This in spite of how many oxy-
moronic intimacies it claims to observe. The titles of some of this research partly trivialise 
these issues through ludic rhyming in their search for even present lesson learning, i.e. 
“lawful but awful” (Knowles and Watson 2018a, 2018b). “Remote warfare” does nothing 
to counter the long-standing tendency of under-writing war:
[. . .] somehow in social and political inquiry, war as a concept is imagined primarily in 
provincial terms, those of the West and its major wars. Real war is interstate war between 
nation-states, fought between regular armed forces. All other conflicts are relegated to 
derivative categories. They are Small Wars, insurgencies, emergencies, interventions, upris-
ings, police actions, or something other than war proper (Barkawi 2016, 199).
As Strachan put it, “Western powers have become accustomed to waging limited wars, 
while using the vocabulary of major war” (2020), and “remote warfare” sits perfectly well 
in this vocabulary because it postulates the permissibility of disengagement. It is a ready- 
made concept that does not stand apart by much and offers a meme version of the 
complexity of contemporary conflicts. Therefore, not only does it fail to translate into an 
actual concept, but remains a term that reproduces some of the poorer practices in 
conceptual development over the last few decades.
Conclusion
In providing a critique of “remote warfare,” this article proposed opening a broader 
discussion about how we think conceptually about contemporary warfare. Does one have 
to re-label reality to make sense of it? Perhaps. Does one have to poorly re-label reality to 
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make sense of it? The article attempted to answer this latter question in the negative. It 
sought a discussion on concept analysis that aimed at understanding the state of the 
semantic field of war and warfare, a background against which it presented a critique of 
the relatively new notion of “remote warfare.” Employing the heuristic value of the 
semantic field and its ability to showcase relations of meaning, the article showed how 
the emerging “remote warfare” debate seems to be caught somewhere between terra 
incognita and terra nulla, the unknown and ownerless land of a literature in search of a 
sub-field and relevance.
In critiquing “remote warfare,” the article followed Laitin’s observation on the benefits 
of sharing a common research language: “if we all share a common vocabulary and 
common standards for evaluation of evidence in light of a theory, we can become a 
community of scholars in common pursuit of valid knowledge” (1995, 454). The analysis 
pointed to the over-reliance on the term and the absence of conceptual structure. It 
pointed to the leaps of empirical logic: over-aggregation and retroactive refitting of 
empirics. Does “remote warfare” revolutionise how we think about security more 
broadly? No. Does it reconstruct how we think about it? It most certainly tries, but 
with caveats and even errors at times – the most significant being that it conflates the 
methods of war with war itself. There is a telegenic quality, a sound bite power to “remote 
warfare” which makes it seemingly popular. However, while “remote warfare” is good for 
a tweet, it is not – yet – good for theory. While it is good for a podcast, it is not ready for 
the paradigm it seeks to posit. Until some of the questions raised here are addressed so as 
to work out some of the term’s problems – ambiguity, vagueness, lack of definition – the 
article errs on the side of caution: we should stop trying to make “remote warfare” 
happen.
Notes
1. I thank one of the reviewers for this observation. I agree with their assessment that the initial 
problems with “remote warfare” stem from its intention to function as a forum and space in 
which people from different academic, journalistic, and policy guises gathered to discuss and 
address broadly related security issues. Therefore, this article takes note of the “big tent” 
quality of the initial thinking behind the concept.
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